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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy during periods of
low and high nancial stress in the US economy using a Threshold Vec-
tor Autoregression model. There is evidence that expansionary monetary
policy is e¤ective during periods of high nancial stress with larger re-
sponses having a higher proportionate e¤ect on output. The existence of a
cost channel e¤ect during periods of high nancial stress implies the exis-
tence of a short run output-ination trade o¤ during nancial crises. Large
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1 Introduction
In the last 40 years, the world economy has experienced several nancial crises
and periods of high nancial stress. The major periods of high nancial stress
include: the 1977 international banking crisis; the 1984 savings and loans (S&L)
crisis; the 1998 Asian nancial crisis; and the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis.
During most of these episodes, policy makers implemented expansionary mon-
etary policies to alleviate nancial stress and help move the economy towards
recovery in terms of GDP growth. The recent crisis has only emphasized that
nancial market conditions are necessary in understanding growth and in forming
subsequent policy responses to support growth as the interrelationship between
nancial conditions and growth are dependent on the state of the nancial and
macroeconomic regimes (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2011); Borio (2014)). As
such, there is clear interest for policy makers in having a better understanding of
the impact of these high nancial stress episodes on the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy and the macroeconomy.
This paper aims to examine the impact and e¤ectiveness of conventional mon-
etary policy via various transmission mechanism channels during periods of low
and high nancial stress in the US economy. A proposed method to deal with
the interrelationships is the inclusion of nancial conditions indexes such as the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicagos Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index
(ANFCI) in macroeconometric models (Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz,
and Watson (2010); Li and St-Amant (2010); Hubrich and Tetlow (2012)). The
ANFCI as described in Brave and Butters (2011) is comprised of 100 indicators
from money markets, debt and equity markets, and the banking system. To-
gether, they cover concepts of nancial market risk, liquidity and leverage and
here are an indicator of nancial stress.
A Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR) model is employed to capture the
asymmetries in the e¤ects of monetary policy on the US economy corresponding
to a switch between the low and high nancial stress regimes. The threshold
variable chosen to endogenize the regime switching is the ANFCI. The economy
is in the high nancial stress regime if the nancial stress conditions are higher
than the estimated threshold value. Conversely, the economy is in the low nan-
cial stress regime if the nancial stress conditions are lower than the estimated
threshold value.
Using the TVAR framework, there are three questions that are the focus of
investigation in this paper.
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1. Do monetary policy shocks have di¤erent e¤ects under the inuence of the
low and high nancial stress regimes?
2. Do monetary policy shocks of di¤erent magnitudes have asymmetric output
e¤ects on the real economy and vice versa?
3. If the economy is in a low nancial stress regime, do increases in the federal
funds rate increase the probability of moving into the high nancial stress
regime and vice versa?
The empirical literature that analyzes the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary pol-
icy on the economy mainly focuses on investigating the asymmetries of the e¤ects
of monetary policy in a business cycle context ( i.e. recession and expansion) us-
ing variants of the Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework. Examples include
Weise (1999), Garcia and Schaller (2002), Kaufmann (2002) and Peersman and
Smets (2002). So far, the empirical literature examining the role that nancial
market developments play in explaining macroeconomic dynamics and business
cycles has been limited. For example, Balke (2000) uses the TVAR framework
and US data to examine the role of credit in monetary policy transmission. The
study emphasizes the ndings in previous studies that the interest rate pass-
through at di¤erent stages of the credit cycle is asymmetric and contractionary
shocks appear to have a greater impact than expansionary ones.
Research employing analysis similar to that conducted in this paper was un-
dertaken by Li and St-Amant (2010) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2012). In Li and
St-Amant (2010), the authors use a TVAR model to analyze the impact of dif-
ferent nancial stress regimes on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in
Canada. The empirical ndings show that contractionary monetary policy shocks
tend to have a larger e¤ect on output than expansionary monetary policy shocks.
Expansionary monetary policy shocks are also found to have larger e¤ects on
output in the high nancial stress regime than in the low nancial stress regime.
However, they nd that the e¤ects of large compared to small shocks are sim-
ilar in their proportionate impact. In Hubrich and Tetlow (2012), the authors
analyze the impact of nancial stress for the US macroeconomy by estimating a
Markov-switching Vector Autoregression model using Bayesian methods. Their
main ndings suggest that there is evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship
between nancial stress and the US macroeconomy. The response of output to
nancial shocks is also found to be di¤erent during periods of high nancial stress
and in normal times, which are periods of low nancial stress. Hence, this paper
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aims to bridge the gap in the literature by estimating a TVAR model to capture
the asymmetries in the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks in the US,
dependent on the nancial conditions. The use of the Adjusted National Finan-
cial Conditions Index provides a more comprehensive measure of the nancial
conditions in the US economy, compared to the single credit measure condition
used in previous studies.
There is a myriad of theoretical models relating nancial conditions to the
macroeconomy through the concepts captured by the ANFCI of risk, liquidity
and leverage (Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010)), and
various papers have analyzed the asymmetric relationship between nancial sec-
tor developments, economic activity and the transmission mechanism channels
of monetary policy shocks. Recent theoretical literature places emphasis on the
nonlinear dynamics in these relationships. Specically, the hypothesized nonlin-
earity in monetary policy in a nancial setting is closely linked to the nancial
accelerator mechanism, introduced in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) which is in
turn closely related to all three concepts of the ANFCI of nancial market risk,
liquidity and leverage.
The nancial accelerator mechanism is dened as the nonlinear inverse re-
lationship between the external nance premium (EFP) that borrowers have to
pay when they seek external funding and the credit rating of the borrower. The
nonlinearity in this relationship arises from the e¤ects of the nancial accelera-
tor, which is expected to be stronger when the net worth of borrowers is lower.
During periods of low nancial stress, rms and households have ample internal
funds and mostly do not require external funding. Moreover, the risk premium
associated with bankruptcy during periods of low nancial stress is low. During
periods of high nancial stress, a decline in cash ow (or liquidity) implies that
rms and households have to seek external funding (leverage). The increase in
risk premium associated with bankruptcy and the low net worth of these borrow-
ers during periods of high nancial crisis implies that any changes in monetary
policy directly translates to large changes in the cost of credit (risk).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) explore the possibility of a nonlinear credit chan-
nel of monetary policy by developing a two-sector model that allows allow for the
nancial accelerator e¤ects, where negative shocks in the balance sheet have a
greater impact on the economy than positive shocks in the balance sheet. The
nancial accelerator concept was empirically tested in Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996), which was also incorporated into the dynamic general equilib-
rium model developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The possibility
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of a nonlinear credit channel of monetary policy has also been noted in the liter-
ature by Azariadis and Smith (1998) and Ravn (2012).
Azariadis and Smith (1998) consider the relationship between credit and pro-
duction in a simple nonmonetary overlapping generations model with production
introduced and showed it is possible for two equilibrium nancial regimes to
exist. The authors develop a model that allows an economy to switch endoge-
nously between a nancially constrained regime that has heightened nancial
stress conditions, such as higher interest rates, and a deterioration of balance
sheets of rms, and a nancially unconstrained regime under reduced nancial
stress conditions. Ravn (2012) built a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with an explicit role for asset prices through the nancial accelerator de-
veloped by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), assuming asymmetry in the relationship
between the nancial accelerator and the net worth of rms. The asymmetric
nancial accelerator is modelled by assuming di¤erent values of the elasticity of
the external nance premium with respect to the net worth of rms. Therefore,
when the entrepreneurswealth is already low, such as during nancial crises,
the external nance premium reacts more strongly to small changes in net worth,
thereby generating asymmetries in responses to monetary policy shocks.
Another monetary transmission channel closely linked to the credit channel of
monetary policy is the supply-side cost channel advanced by Barth and Ramey
(2001). The cost channel explains two empirical puzzles. First, it provides a
means to explain the observed larger output e¤ect of monetary policy shocks
during periods of high nancial stress compared to periods of low nancial stress.
Second, the price puzzle often observed in standard Vector Autoregression (VAR)
models is not actually a puzzle but is a response of output to the supply side
of monetary policy shocks. The cost channel hypothesis heavily relies on the
role of net working capital in the production process. The net working capital
consist of inventories and trade receivables, net trade payables. There is a general
consensus that interest rate and credit conditions can a¤ect rmslong run ability
to invest in xed capital and produce nal output. However, the authors argue
that changes in the interest rate and credit conditions can also a¤ect rmsability
to produce nal output by investing in net working capital. Insights from the
credit channel help to better explain the cost channel mechanism. During periods
of high nancial stress with falling demand, rms are likely to be accumulating
inventories, resulting in an increase in the stock of net working capital. With a
decline in cash ow, rms are forced to turn to external funding.a
aThis mechanism is not unrelated to Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) who show that impulse
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During periods of low nancial stress, the opportunity cost of internal funds
increases directly with the federal funds rate. However, during periods of high
nancial stress when rms are forced to seek external funding, the marginal cost
of nancing increases substantially and in a nonlinear manner as described by
the credit channel, due to information asymmetry in the credit markets. The in-
crease in the cost of external nancing results in an increase in the marginal cost
of production for rms, which corresponds to a direct increase in prices. Using
aggregate and industry level US data, Barth and Ramey (2001) also provide evi-
dence supporting the existence of a cost channel in the US over the last 40 years,
with a contractionary monetary policy shock increasing the price/wage ratio in
a VAR model. Complementing Barth and Ramey (2001), general equilibrium
models examining the supply side of monetary policy such as Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (1997) explain this mechanism through the timing of payments
to factors of production prior to revenue receipt leading to increased borrowing
requirements and costs, again, also reected in the nancial conditions variables
of leverage and liquidity.
The empirical results in this paper provide several insights into the relation-
ship between the nancial sector developments and the US economy. First, there
is evidence of nonlinearity, dependent on nancial stress conditions. Second, there
is evidence of an increase in prices, consistent with a cost channel e¤ect, in re-
sponse to an expansionary monetary policy shock during periods of high nancial
stress. No dominant cost channel e¤ect is found during periods of low nancial
stress. This implies that there is a short run output-ination trade o¤ during
nancial crises when policymakers are likely to be conducting expansionary mon-
etary policies. Hence, the optimal course of monetary policy during nancial
crises should take into consideration of this short run output-ination trade o¤.
Third, strong evidence has been found of the existence of the credit channel and
nancial accelerator mechanism during periods of high nancial stress, where the
output response to monetary policy shocks is larger than periods of low nancial
stress. This nding implies that monetary policy shocks can be both e¤ective
and potent for the US economy during nancial crises. Fourth, there is evidence
that large expansionary monetary policy shocks have a proportionately higher
impact on output than smaller expansions during periods of high nancial mar-
ket stress. Last, the empirical ndings also suggest that large contractionary
monetary policy shocks can increase the likelihood of the economy moving from
responses for output can di¤er across the year in response to the uneven staggering of wage
contracts
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a low nancial stress to high nancial stress regime by a substantial amount.
Likewise, large expansionary monetary policy shocks increase the likelihood of
moving the economy out of a high nancial stress regime.
The benchmark model is estimated from 1973 - 2008. Two additional models
are examined which extend the end of the sample to include periods of the crisis
corresponding to the Great Recession (ending 2012) and then the Recovery period
(ending 2015). The crisis and recovery periods are dened based on the Federal
Reserve rst mentioning that quantitative easing would be withdrawn in 2013,
indicating that the economy was seen to be recovering from this time.b
The comparisons to the benchmark period provide interesting results. For the
crisis period, expansionary monetary policy during periods of high nancial stress
when the prevailing interest rate is at the zero lower bound has continued to be
e¤ective, through the lowering of interest rates and credit spreads, and shifting
the US economy from a high nancial stress to a low nancial stress regime. The
output-ination trade o¤ persists in this extended sample, providing evidence of
a dominant supply-side cost channel e¤ect during periods of high nancial stress.
By 2015, the ine¤ectiveness of conventional monetary policy is clearly evident.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical model
and details model specication and estimation issues. Section 3 presents the
empirical results on the relationship between monetary policy and the nancial
stress regime, comparing expansionary monetary policy and contractionary mon-
etary policy shocks across regimes. Section 4 examines the Great Recession and
recovery period. Section 5 analyses the probability of regime switching, while
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical specications
2.1 Model
A Threshold Vector Autoregression (TVAR) approach is used in this paper to
examine the asymmetric reactions to monetary policy shocks in the low and
high nancial stress regimes. An alternative to the TVAR model is the Markov-
switching VAR (MSVAR) model proposed by Hamilton (1989) and commonly
used to di¤erentiate between recessions and booms. MSVAR models assume
that the latent state is exogenous, implying that regime switching occurs due to
movements in the unobservable variable. However, it is plausible for endogenous
bhttp://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm
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movements amongst observable variables to lead to regime switching. The TVAR
model allows regime switching to take place (see also Balke (2000)). For example,
in the context of this paper, an increase in the federal funds rate can result in
changes in the nancial conditions in the economy, causing a switch in regime.
As the main objective of this paper is to examine monetary policy asymmetries
in the low and high nancial stress regimes, the threshold variable used in the
model is the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index. In the TVAR model
estimated in this paper, there are two regimes, the low and high nancial stress
regimes, dened by a boundary which is equal to certain value of the threshold
variable. The coe¢ cients of the TVAR system are specic to each regime, where
the process within each regime can be described by a linear model. The TVAR
model can be described as follows in equation 1,
Yt = B1 + 1(L)Yt + (B2 + 2(L)Yt)I(y

t d > ) + t; (1)
where Yt is a vector containing US data for real GDP, ination, the commodity
price index, federal funds rate, ANFCI and the exchange rate. Real GDP, the
commodity price index and the exchange rate are in percentage log-deviations
from a deterministic trend. I is an indicator function that equals one if the
threshold variable yt at lag order d (the delay parameter) is greater than the
threshold  and zero otherwise. The delay parameter d implies that if the thresh-
old variable yt d crosses the threshold value of  at time t   d; the dynamics
actually change at time t: The lag polynomials 1(L) and 2(L) describe the
dynamics of the TVAR system. With the threshold variable yt d as a function
of US nancial conditions (the ANFCI), which is an element in Yt, the TVAR
describes both the evolution of Yt and that of the nancial stress regimes. This
implies that shocks to the federal funds rate can determine whether the economy
moves to a low or high nancial stress regime.
By construction, the TVAR model implies that heteroskedasticity can be as-
sumed across the two regimes as the process within each regime can be described
by a linear model as in equation 2,
Yt = B1 + 1(L)Yt + 1;t + (B2 + 2(L)Yt + 2;t)I(y

t d > ): (2)
2.2 Data and specication issues
Quarterly data for the time period spanning 1973Q12008Q4 are used in the
baseline model of this paper. This period is chosen as in the majority of the
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sample, the economy operates normally, with no issues relating to structural
changes in the conduct of monetary policy, or relating to the abnormally high
magnitude of the shocks hitting the economy. The main objective of this paper is
to analyze the impact of conventional monetary policy during periods of high and
low nancial stress with an emphasis on the non-linearities of the model. Similar
analyses for the period ending crisis period ending 2012Q4 and the recovery period
ending 2015Q5 is undertaken but it is recognized that this period is constrained
by the zero lower bound of the federal funds rate. Nonetheless, understanding
the nonlinear dynamics of the adjustment of the economy to the di¤erent shocks
is still of interest.c
The data consists of six variables and we assume the following recursive causal
ordering: Real GDP; ination; the commodity price index; the federal funds
rate; the ANFCI; and the exchange rate. The exchange rate variable is a real
trade weighted index, with an increase in the value of the index representing an
appreciation of the US dollar. This ordering assumes that the nancial market
variables are more responsive to the macroeconomic variables contemporaneously
than the macroeconomy is to nancial markets. GDP is assumed not to respond
to nancial market conditions contemporaneously and is only able to be a¤ected
through the lag structure of the model. The core macroeconomic variables of
ination, commodity prices and interest rates respond to GDP and each other
contemporaneously in causal order, with the federal funds rate responding to all
of the macroeconomy each quarter. The ANFCI capture data releases that occur
weekly, monthly and quarterly and is updated each Wednesday and it is assumed
that the nancial market indicator will quickly respond to the macroeconomy.
Most of the elements of the nancial conditions index are also likely to have a
direct relationship with the federal funds rate, particularly as the federal funds
rate is a benchmark in pricing, which makes its logical place in the order of
variables after the federal funds rate. The exchange rate is the fastest moving
variable, adjusting to both domestic and international conditions instantaneously,
justifying the order of the nancial market variables.
This ordering is essentially the same as that of Li and St-Amant (2010) and
Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) who also incorporate nancial market indices in their
models. Alternative orderings were tried with the nancial market variables
cThe federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound of 50 basis points since 2009Q1. The
policy interest rate cannot be exactly zero as there would be various transaction costs detailed
in Oda and Okina (2001). Krugman (1998) argues that a nominal rate of 0.43 percent is a good
approximation of an economy that is facing liquidity trap conditions. Studies in the literature
typically choose 50 basis points to be the zero lower bound (e.g., Iwata and Wu (2006)).
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coming rst followed by the macroeconomic variables.d The results di¤ered to
those chosen for this paper. However, the ordering and set of results presented in
the paper seemmost sensible. An alternative strategy such as sign restrictions was
not chosen as we wanted to allow for the possibility that the signs of responses
might be di¤erent in the high and low stress regimes and we did not want to
specify what they should be in this application.
Table A1 in Appendix A provides more information on the source of the data
used in this paper. All variables are made stationary prior to the estimation of
the TVAR. Hence, real GDP, the commodity price index and the exchange rate
variables are dened in percentage log-deviations from a deterministic trend, and
ination is the annualized ination rate. The chosen lag length of the TVAR
model is one lag, determined by the Schwarz information (SC) and Hannan-
Quinn (HQ) information criteria.
2.3 Transition variable
The transition variable is chosen to be the ANFCI which is constructed based on
100 indicators of nancial activity by the Chicago Federal Reserve. The compo-
sition of the ANFCI indicator is from money markets (54% of the indicators in
the index), debt and equity markets (26%), and the banking system (20%) and
provides a broad overview of US nancial conditions in terms of risk, liquidity
and leverage in money markets and debt and equity markets as well as in the
traditional and shadowbanking systems. A positive ANFCI value implies that
nancial conditions are tighter than the average, while a negative value implies
the opposite.
In parallel with the ANFCI, the Chicago Federal Reserve also constructs a
National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI). The di¤erence between the two
is that the ANFCI has the inuence of economic conditions removed from the
NFCI nancial conditions measure. Brave and Butters (2012) also show that the
ANFCI is a forward looking indicator of the NFCI and that the ANFCI provides a
superior forecast of GDP growth. The ANFCI is chosen as the transition variable
rather than the NFCI for this reason, and also because the index is more relevant
for isolating pure nancial conditions which should provide for a cleaner economic
interpretation of the impulse response functions.
dThe impulse response functions for the alternative ordering of the variables are available
on request.
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2.4 TVAR model estimation and non-linearity tests
The threshold where switching occurs between the low and high nancial stress
regimes is determined endogenously by a grid search over possible values of the
ANFCI threshold variable. The grid is constructed such that 20 percent of the
upper and lower bound values are trimmed to ensure there are at least a minimum
of 48 observations in each regime.e ;f A TVAR model for each threshold gridpoint
is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).g The estimated threshold value
corresponds to the model with the smallest determinant of the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimated residuals:
 = argmin

log j
()j :
The estimated threshold value for the Adjusted National Financial Conditions
Index is 0.2630. To put this threshold value into perspective, Figure 1 plots the
Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index and its estimated threshold value.
The estimated threshold value of 0.2630 accurately identies some of the major
high nancial stress periods such as the Asian nancial crisis in 1997 and the
subprime mortgage crisis in 2007.h
It is also important to test if the chosen threshold value is meaningful by
employing non-linearity tests to each equation of the TVAR system. The null
hypothesis is that the coe¢ cients of B2 and 2(L) equal zero is expressed in
equation 3 as follows:
H0 = B2 and 2(L) = 0: (3)
When the threshold is known, the null hypothesis can be tested using a Wald
test. In this paper, the threshold is not identied under the null. Hence, according
to Hansen (1996), standard inference cannot be applied and asymptotic p-values
need to be derived.
eThe level of trimming of the grid is chosen arbitrarily. The standard level of trimming
often used in the existing literature is between 15 and 20 percent.
fThe feature of the TVAR model is that there are two regimes (here, low and high stress),
but the data can switch in and out of each regime through time. For example, inspection of
Figure 1 shows that there are periods of high stress during the international banking crisis, the
debt crisis, the savings and loan crisis, the Asian nancial crisis and the subprime mortgage
crisis, and during the rest of the time the level of nancial stress is low. This means that a
single demarcation date as would be identied by traditional structural break tests separating
regimes is less applicable in the TVAR estimation.
gAn alternative method used in other papers is to arbitrarily x the threshold value of the
switching variable.
hNote that the value of the threshold is estimated using the benchmark sample period from
1973Q1 to 2008Q4, but is plotted against the sample period in the sensitivity analysis which
extends to 2015Q4.
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Figure 1: The Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index and its estimated
threshold value (0.2630).
Let W  be the sup-Wald statistic of all possible statistics over the grid:
W  = sup

W (): (4)
As  is not identied under the null hypothesis, the distribution of this sup-
Wald statistic does not follow a 2 distribution. Asymptotic p-values are derived
from the empirical distribution for the sup-Wald statistic using the bootstrap
procedure of Hansen (1996, 1997).
Non-linearity is tested for each equation of the TVAR system. Table 1 presents
the non-linearity test results of a linear VAR against a threshold alternative for
each equation of the TVAR system. The non-linearity test results show that
the real GDP equation display threshold e¤ects, which is our key indicator of
economic strength. Hence, there is evidence that the ANFCI is an appropriate
threshold variable. More importantly, the non-linearity tests provide evidence
that the estimated threshold value is meaningful in separating the high nancial
stress regime from the low nancial stress regime which are statistically di¤erent
from one another.
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Table 1: Asymptotic p-values for sup-Wald statistics of non-linearity tests for
each equation in the model. The threshold variable is the ANFCI
Equation p-values
Real GDP 0.046
Ination 0.182
Commodity price index 0.189
Federal funds rate 0.125
Financial conditions index 0.746
Exchange rate 0.730
2.5 Interpretation of results
Impulse response analysis is conducted to investigate the asymmetric e¤ects of
monetary policy shocks in the low and high nancial stress regimes. Two sets
of impulse responses are constructed regime-dependent impulse responses and
nonlinear impulse responses. This paper is most interested in the nonlinear im-
pulse responses.
Regime-dependent impulse responses In the regime-dependent impulse re-
sponses, the economy is assumed to remain within the respective regime which
was in place when the shock initially hits. Given that the process within each
regime can be described by a linear model, the regime-dependent impulse re-
sponses can be obtained by using the estimated coe¢ cients for each regime. These
impulse responses are linear in shocks and are history independent. Regime-
dependent impulse responses are useful in describing the behavior of the economy
within each regime. However, using regime-dependent impulse response functions
may not be su¢ cient to analyze the overall impact of a shock to the economy,
particularly where a shock to the federal funds rate can result in a change in the
nancial conditions, resulting in a switch in regime.
Nonlinear impulse responses The second set of impulse response functions
relaxes the above assumption that the economy remains in the same regime pre-
vailing at the time of the shock. In this second set of impulse response functions,
the economy is allowed to move from one regime to another. In particular, a
shock to the federal funds rate can generate movements in the threshold variable,
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the ANFCI, which then induce regime switching over the forecast horizon. When
the system is allowed to switch between regimes, the impulse response functions
depend on the initial state, size and sign of the shock. In order to measure the im-
pulse responses when the threshold variable is allowed to respond endogenously,
this paper computes the nonlinear impulse response functions following Koop,
Pesaran, and Potter (1996). Appendices B and C provide further information
on the algorithm used to compute the nonlinear impulse response functions and
the condence bands respectively. The condence bands calculated based on the
nonlinear impulse responses are available in Appendix D.
In the nonlinear impulse response functions, the economy is assumed to be
in one of the two regimes and are history-dependent. A shock to the federal
funds rate can result in changes in the threshold variable, the ANFCI, which
can then induce regime switching over the forecast horizon. When the system is
allowed to switch between regimes, the impulse response functions are sensitive
to the initial state, size and sign of the shock, and are thus shock-dependent.
The nonlinear impulse response of a variable y at horizon n can be dened as the
di¤erences in two conditional expectations due to a shock at time t, dependent
on the economy being in a particular regime. This nonlinear impulse response is
denoted in equation 5,
IRFy(n; ut;
t 1) = E[yt+nj
t 1; ut]  E[yt+nj
t 1]; (5)
where 
t 1 is the information set at time t   1. The size and sign of the shock
and the initial conditions of the regime that the economy is starting in, 
t 1,
are required to calculate the impulse responses. The conditional expectations
E[yt+nj
t 1; ut] and E[yt+nj
t 1] are computed by simulating the model.
The nonlinear impulse responses can be simulated through the following steps.
First, shocks for periods 0 to 60 are simulated using the Cholesky decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix for the TVAR model. For given initial values of
the variables, these shocks are fed through the estimated model to produce a set
of simulated data series. The result from this step is a forecast of the variables
conditional on initial values and a particular sequence of shocks, denoted as the
baseline forecast. Second, the same procedure is repeated with the same set of
initial values and shocks, with the shock to the federal funds rate in period 0
xed at 1 standard deviation. The shocks are fed through the model to obtain a
forecast of the variables. The impulse response function for a set of initial values
and particular sequence of shocks is then the di¤erence between this forecast and
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the baseline forecast. This simulation is repeated for 500 draws of the shocks to
allow the shocks to average out. Subsequently, these impulse response functions
are averaged over the respective regime history to produce an impulse response
function conditional only on initial values.
3 Monetary policy and the nancial stress regime
This Section uses the regime-dependent and the nonlinear impulse response analy-
sis to answer two questions. First, do monetary policy shocks have di¤erent e¤ects
in the low and high nancial stress regimes? Second, do monetary policy shocks
of di¤erent magnitudes have asymmetric e¤ects on the real economy, particu-
larly on output? Section 3.1 outlines the case assuming that the regime does
not change. The following Subsections examine the impact of expansionary and
contractionary monetary policies on the economy in the low and high nancial
stress regimes. As nonlinear impulse responses are not symmetric in their im-
pulses, di¤erent impulse responses can be expected from examining the impact of
expansionary (Section 3.2.1) and contractionary (Section 3.2.2) monetary policies
on the economy in the low and high nancial stress regimes respectively. These
latter Sections also compare the e¤ects of federal funds rate shocks of di¤erent
magnitudes.
3.1 Regime-dependent impulse responses
Given that the process within each regime can be described by a linear model,
the regime-dependent impulse responses can be obtained by using the estimated
coe¢ cients for each regime. These impulse responses are linear in shocks and are
history independent. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses during low nancial
stress and high nancial stress regimes as a result of a 1 standard deviation
decline in the federal funds rate, assuming that the economy stays in the regime
prevailing at the time of the shock. The impulse responses shown are cumulated
responses except for output, the federal funds rate, and the exchange rate.
A decline in the federal funds rate leads to an increase in output, loosening of
nancial conditions and an eventual depreciation in the exchange rate in both the
low and high nancial stress regimes. Prices increase in the low nancial stress
regime as expected with the increase in output. Prices initially decline for about
a year before increasing.
A closer look at the impulse responses reveals signicant di¤erences across
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Figure 2: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate in the
low and high nancial stress regimes over 60 quarters with no regime switching.
The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid lines refer to low
nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress regimes.
regimes. First, the magnitude of the impulse responses di¤ers strongly. The re-
sponse in output increases by much more in the high nancial stress regime than
in the low nancial stress regime. This is an indication that the nancial accel-
erator e¤ect as described in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) may be in place. The -
nancial accelerator e¤ect is expected to be stronger during nancial crises when
entrepreneurswealth is low. More specically, through the bank lending and
balance sheet transmission channels, a monetary expansion that takes place in a
high nancial stress regime is expected to result in a larger increase in asset prices
and larger decline in the external cost of funding (the external nance premium)
than in the low nancial stress regime. This implies that variables that describe
the real economy such as output and ination are expected to increase more in
a high nancial stress regime than in a low nancial stress regime in response to
monetary policy. This observation is similar to the results found by McCallum
(1991), where the author nds that money supply shocks have a larger impact
on output during periods in which the economy is experiencing tight credit cir-
cumstances. This nding and the results in McCallum (1991) are also consistent
with the hypothesis put forward in Blinder (1987), where a tightening of mone-
tary policy has stronger e¤ects on the real economy when the credit is already
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tight but weak e¤ects when credit is initially abundant.
Second, the observation of an initial decline in ination in the high nancial
stress regime and not in the low nancial stress regime is consistent with the
cost channel e¤ect suggested by Barth and Ramey (2001). When the economy
is in a high nancial stress regime with constrained credit, demand within the
economy is expected to decline. The decline in demand means that rms are
faced with accumulating inventories and accounts receivable as well as falling
cash ow. Firms are forced to seek external nancing due to the decline in
internally generated funds as the stock of working capital rises. Insights from
the credit channel suggest that a monetary expansion in a high nancial stress
regime decreases the cost of external nancing by more than in a low nancial
stress regime. In fact, during periods when the nancial stress is low, changes
in monetary policy should not inuence the cost of credit for borrowers. This
implies that rmsinterest expenses on working capital and hence marginal cost
of production and output prices are expected to decrease by much more in a
high nancial stress regime than in a low nancial stress regime. Therefore,
the expansionary monetary policy shock that may initially work through the
demand channel may be propagated through the supply side channel eventually.
The existence of a cost channel e¤ect during nancial crises when policymakers
are likely to be conducting expansionary monetary policies suggests the existence
of a short run output-ination trade o¤.
Third, the standard exchange rate channel e¤ects can be observed from the
eventual depreciation of the exchange rate in both high and low nancial stress
regimes. However, following the decline in the federal funds rate, the depreciation
of the exchange rate in the high nancial stress regime has been immediate, but
gradual in the low nancial stress regime. This di¤erence in the reaction of the
exchange rate suggests that the exchange rate plays a particularly important role
in boosting the economy during periods of high nancial stress.
3.2 Monetary policy and nancial stress
3.2.1 Expansionary monetary policy
The nonlinear impulse response functions from the estimation of the TVARmodel
with regime switching to a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds
rate are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The impulses start from an initial state of
either low or high nancial stress respectively . As before, the impulse responses
shown are cumulated responses except for output, federal funds rate, and the
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exchange rate.
10 20 30 40 50 60-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Output
10 20 30 40 50 60-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Prices
10 20 30 40 50 60-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Federal funds rate
10 20 30 40 50 60-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Financial conditions index
10 20 30 40 50 60-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Exchange rate
Figure 3: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-
2008Q4. Note: Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer
to high nancial stress regimes.
A 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate eventually leads to an
increase in output in the low and high nancial stress regimes. However, in the
high nancial stress regime, output decreases initially before gradually increasing
to a level above that of the response of output in the low nancial stress regime.
This nding reinforces the results from the earlier estimated regime-dependent
impulse response. The nancial conditions in both regimes loosen as expected.
The decrease in the federal funds rate implies that US dollar deposits become
less attractive relative to deposits denominated in foreign currencies. This leads
to a decline in the value of the US dollar relative to other currencies. Hence, the
exchange rate depreciates in both regimes, with the exchange rate depreciating
to a larger extent in the high nancial stress regime. The greater depreciation
in the exchange rate in the high nancial stress regime is particularly helpful
in boosting the economy when it is initially in the high nancial stress regime.
This nding suggests that the exchange rate e¤ect plays an important role in the
recovery of the economy during periods of high nancial stress.
Price responses di¤er across regimes. Prices increase in the low nancial stress
regime and decrease in the high nancial stress regime. The increase in prices
in the low nancial stress regime following the increase in output is consistent
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Figure 4: Impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-
2008Q4. Note: Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer
to high nancial stress regimes.
with the demand channel of monetary transmission. Similarly, the decrease in
ination in the high nancial stress regime once again conrms that the cost
channel e¤ect is in place during periods of high nancial stress.
What is of most interest is that the impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation
decline in the federal funds rate are similar in shape and signs to the impulse
responses to a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate. However,
the larger increase in output in the high nancial stress regime compared to
the low nancial stress regime is clearer with a 2 standard deviation decline in
the federal funds rate. This feature is demonstrated more clearly in Figures 5
and 6 which present impulse responses to 1 and 2 standard deviation declines in
the federal funds rate in the low and high nancial stress regimes respectively.
Impulse responses for the 2 standard deviation shock are scaled down by a factor
of two in order to allow direct comparison with the responses to a 1 standard
deviation shock.
Overall, the impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds
rate on output is stronger than the 1 standard deviation decline in the federal
funds rate, particularly in the high nancial stress regime. This nding suggests
that large expansionary monetary policies are e¤ective and more potent during
nancial crises, via the credit channel, with the larger shock resulting in higher
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Figure 5: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from
1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard
deviation decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
economic growth, while the smaller shock is unable to stimulate the economy.
3.2.2 Contractionary monetary policy
The nonlinear impulse response functions to a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase
in the federal funds rate starting from an initial state of low and high nancial
stress are displayed in Figures 7 and 8 respectively. Following the increase in the
federal funds rate, output declines by more in the high nancial stress regime
compared to the low nancial stress regime. This provides evidence that the
credit channel e¤ect exists during periods of high nancial stress, regardless of
the type of shock that takes place (see also Figures 3 and 4 for the expansionary
monetary policy shock). Financial conditions tighten in both regimes.
Overall, prices decline in both regimes for both shock sizes apart from a
slight rise in prices observed in the high nancial stress regime in the event of
the contractionary 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate. Once
again, prices respond asymmetrically and fall more in the high nancial stress
regime than in the low nancial stress regime, which is also consistent with the
larger decline in output observed in the high nancial stress regime. This short
duration increase in prices is again consistent with a cost channel e¤ect due to
an increase in the marginal cost of nancing. The e¤ect lasts for about a year
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Figure 6: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the high nancial stress regime over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from
1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard
deviation decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 7: Impact of a 1 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-
2008Q4. Note: Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer
to high nancial stress regimes.
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Figure 8: Impact of a 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
before prices begin their substantial fall.
In the medium and longer term, there is no evidence for the cost channel of
the transmission of contractionary monetary policy as was evident in the event
of the expansionary monetary policy shock in the high stress periods as shown in
Figures 3 and 4 in Section 3.2.1. This result points to the general dominance of the
demand channel of monetary policy transmission in the event of a contractionary
monetary policy shock in both low and high stress regimes, as well as for the
expansionary monetary policy in the low stress regime. While the price responses
are indicative of a demand transmission channel of monetary policy, this does
not imply that the cost transmission channel of monetary policy does not exist.
Instead, it is likely that the demand channel e¤ects dominate in this instance. The
exchange rate appreciates in both regimes, with the appreciation in exchange rate
stronger in the high nancial stress regime than in the low nancial stress regime.
This di¤erence in the appreciation of the exchange rate is more pronounced with
a 2 standard deviation federal funds rate shock. Furthermore, the appreciation in
the exchange rate also results in cheaper imported materials. Hence, any direct
cost-side e¤ects of a contractionary monetary policy may have been counteracted
by the exchange rate e¤ect.
Impulse responses to 1 and 2 standard deviation increases in the federal funds
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rate in the low and high nancial stress regimes are compared in Figures 9 and
10 respectively. In the low nancial stress period, the di¤erence in impulses for
output is less pronounced with the economy responding positively in both cases.
The gures show the devastating e¤ects on output of a contractionary monetary
policy during the high nancial stress regime.
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Figure 9: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime over 60 quarters. The model is estimated from
1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard
deviation decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
4 The Great Recession and recovery
In this Section, the end of the sample is extended to analyze if the addition
of the Great Recession period as well as the recovery period has any impact
on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy. Two additional experiments are
undertaken. First, the sample period is extended from 2008Q4 to 2012Q4. The
period from 2009Q1 to 2012Q4 is characterized by very tight nancial conditions
initially, and rapid loosening of the nancial conditions for the rest of the extended
sample. Ination remained relatively stable while the federal funds rate hit the
zero lower bound. Second, the end of the sample is extended to 2015Q4 to analyze
if the addition of the recovery period from the subprime mortgage crisis and the
Great Recessions periods has any impact on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary
policy. The recovery period is characterized from 2013Q1 to 2015Q4 and as
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Figure 10: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds
rate in the high nancial stress regime over 60 quarters. The model is estimated
from 1973Q1-2008Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2
standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
mentioned earlier is dened based on the Federal Reserve rst mentioning that
quantitative easing would be withdrawn in 2013 indicating that the economy was
seen to be recovering from this time. The data in the additional to the sample is
characterized by mostly loosening nancial conditions, coupled with low ination
and mild deation at times, while the federal funds rate continues to remain at
the zero lower bound.
The threshold value used in the estimations in this Section is xed at 0.2630,
which is the threshold value estimated in the baseline case using sample period of
1973Q1 to 2008Q4. There are two reasons for this. First, keeping the threshold
value for the estimations at 0.2630 allows comparison with the baseline case. The
baseline threshold is calculated using a relatively long and stable (with relatively
small crisis perturbations), better reecting a normally functioning US economy.
As the threshold value is going to be data dependent and given the magnitude of
shocks in the great recession period it is desirable to use the threshold estimated
from a normal period of time. Conrming the validity of this assumption is
that the threshold value estimated using the new sample of 1973Q1 to 2012Q4
is at 0.3975, which is found to be insignicant using the nonlinearity test of
Hansen (1996). The higher estimated threshold value also reduces the number
of observations in the higher nancial stress regime to 43 observations, below
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the minimum of 48 required in each regime to ensure stability. The results are
contained in Figures 11 to 15. Only the results for the nonlinear expansionary
monetary policy shocks are presented. The complete set of results including the
regime specic and nonlinear impulse responses can be found in Appendices E
and F.
The results from the extended samples from 1973Q1 to 2012Q4 and then from
1973Q1 to 2015Q4 provide some interesting insights into the impact of the Great
Recession and recovery period on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy.
First, the nonlinear impulse responses suggest that the e¤ects of expansionary
monetary policy shocks in the low and high nancial stress regimes remain asym-
metric. In particular, the response of output in the high nancial stress regime in
the sample ending in 2012 remains larger than the response of output in the low
nancial stress regime, providing evidence on the nonlinear credit channel e¤ect
of Bernanke and Gertler (1989). This nding also emphasizes the results from the
previous Section that expansionary monetary policy is more potent and e¤ective
during periods of high nancial stress than in periods of low nancial stress. The
additional sample periods from 2009Q1 to 2012Q4 are periods marked by ex-
tremely low interest rates. According to Krugman (1998), such periods provide a
good approximation to liquidity trap conditions, implying that the interest rate
channel of monetary policy shocks is eliminated. However, as argued by Mishkin
(2009), the extremely low prevailing interest rates can be useful, helping to lower
the interest rates on default-free securities and to lower credit spreads. This is
reected in the improvement in nancial conditions in the high nancial stress
regime.i In contrast, the results for the sample period ending in 2015 also show
asymmetries, but the response of output and prices to the expansionary mone-
tary policy shock are now stronger in the low stress regime than the high stress
regime, reecting the impotence of traditional monetary policy in the recovery
period.
Second, prices decline in the presence of expansionary monetary policy and
rise in response to contractionary monetary policyj in the high nancial stress
regime for both the 2012 model and the 2015 model. This observation provides
unambiguous evidence of a dominant supply-side cost channel e¤ect in the high
nancial stress regime. Previously, using the sample from 1973Q1 to 2008Q4,
prices decline in the presence of contractionary monetary policy only in the high
nancial stress regime. This suggests that the Great Recession period reinforced
iSimilar results hold for the contractionary monetary policy case.
jSee Appendices E and F.
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Figure 11: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
the cost channel e¤ect, leading to a short run output-ination trade o¤. This
result is consistent with the high cost of credit reected in the Baa corporate
bond rates that have remained high during the extended sample period from
2009Q1 to 2012Q4 despite the extremely low federal funds rate.
Third, the response of output to small and large monetary policy shocks are
similar in magnitudes in both the low and high nancial stress regimes, implying
that a large monetary policy shock is no di¤erent from a small monetary policy
shock during the extended sample period. Figure 15 illustrates this result for the
sample period ending in 2015. In the previous Section, the response of output to
large monetary policy shocks is found to be larger than the response of output to
small monetary policy shocks. This result reects the ine¤ectiveness for monetary
policy over the extended sample from 2009Q1 to 2015Q4.
5 Monetary policy and regime switching
In this Section, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the probability of transit-
ing between the low and high nancial stress regimes based on the initial sample
of 1973Q1 to 2008Q4 is examined. In particular, the following questions are of
interest. First, suppose the economy is initially in the low nancial stress regime,
does a contractionary monetary policy shock increase the probability of moving
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Figure 12: Impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Output
10 20 30 40 50 60
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Prices
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Federal funds rate
10 20 30 40 50 60
-1
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Financial conditions index
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Exchange rate
Figure 13: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 14: Impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 15: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the high nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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from the low to high nancial stress regime? Second, suppose the economy is ini-
tially in the high nancial stress regime, does an expansionary monetary policy
shock increase the probability of moving from the high to low nancial stress
regime?
The probability of the economy being in the low nancial stress regime, given
the information set, 
t 1, at time t  1, and a particular realization of an exoge-
nous shock ut at time t, is denoted as:
P (low nancial stress regime) = P [I(yt d  )j
t 1; ut]: (6)
Likewise, the probability of the economy being in the high nancial stress regime
is denoted as:
P (high nancial stress regime) = P [I(yt d > )j
t 1; ut]: (7)
The impulse response functions of the threshold variable are calculated for
each observation in the initial regime. The probability of regime switching is
estimated by calculating the number of times the switching variable crossed the
threshold value of 0.2630. Specically, the probabilities of regime switching for
the economy starting in the low and high nancial stress regimes can be computed
respectively as in equations 8 and 9 in the following manner.
P (low nancial stress regime) =
1
n
nX
i=1
[I(yt d  )j
t 1; ut]; (8)
and
P (high nancial stress regime) =
1
n
nX
i=1
[I(yt d > )j
t 1; ut]: (9)
Figure 16 displays the estimated empirical probability of transiting from the
low nancial stress to the high nancial stress regime under various shocks,
namely 1 and 2 standard deviation contractionary and expansionary monetary
policy shocks, and the baseline case of a zero shock. The results suggest that large
contractionary monetary policy shocks of 2 standard deviations can substantially
increase the likelihood of the economy switching from the low to the high nancial
stress regime, with the probability rising by about 40%. In contrast, expansion-
ary monetary policy shocks do not substantially decrease the likelihood of the
economy switching to the high nancial stress regime compared to the baseline
case of a zero shock.
The estimated empirical probability of transiting from the high to the low -
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Figure 16: Empirical probability of switching from low to high nancial stress
regime over 30 quarters following small and large contractionary and expansion-
ary monetary policy shocks.
nancial stress regime are plotted in Figure 17. The ndings show that expansion-
ary monetary policy shocks, particularly large ones, can substantially increase the
likelihood of the economy switching from the high to low nancial stress regime.
The probability of moving from high to low stress regimes increases by almost
50% with a 2 standard deviation expansionary monetary policy shocks, showing
that large expansionary monetary policy shocks can be helpful in moving the US
economy towards a recovery from nancial crises. These results imply that mon-
etary policy shocks play an important role in the endogenous regime switching
between the low and high nancial stress regimes.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the asymmetry in the impact of con-
ventional monetary policy through various transmission mechanism channels in
di¤erent nancial regimes, namely the low and high nancial stress regimes, in
the US economy. A TVAR model, using nancial conditions as the threshold
variable, is estimated to capture the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy and
regime switching implied by the theoretical literature.
The empirical results shed some light on the relationship between nancial
sector developments and the US economy. There is evidence of nonlinearity in
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Figure 17: Empirical probability of switching from high to low nancial stress
regime over 30 quarters following small and large contractionary and expansion-
ary monetary policy shocks.
the data, with a regime switch occurring if nancial stress conditions reach the
estimated threshold value. The ndings in this paper generally suggest that
monetary policy shocks play an important role in the US economy during nan-
cial crises. There is evidence of a greater output response to monetary policy
shocks during periods of high nancial stress. Large expansionary monetary pol-
icy shocks are also found to increase the likelihood of moving the economy out of a
high nancial stress regime. It is particularly interesting to note that there is ev-
idence of a cost channel of monetary policy during periods of high nancial stress
consistent with the cost channel e¤ect put forward by Barth and Ramey (2001),
implying the existence of a short run output-ination trade o¤ during nancial
crises when policymakers are more likely to implement expansionary monetary
policies. The existence of a dominant cost channel e¤ect during nancial crises
highlight the need for policymakers to carefully weigh the output-ination trade
o¤ in the short run when deciding on the magnitude of expansionary monetary
policies to implement in an attempt to guide the economy out of a nancial crisis.
The extension of the end of the sample from 2008Q4 to 2012Q4 provides
further evidence that expansionary monetary policy is more e¤ective and po-
tent during periods of high nancial stress compared to periods of low nancial
stress. The results suggest that expansionary monetary policy, during periods of
high nancial stress when prevailing interest rates are at the zero lower bound,
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was e¤ective up until 2012, likely due to the lower interest rates on default-free
securities and lower credit spreads, shifting the US economy from a high to a
low nancial stress regime. The ndings also provide unambiguous evidence of
a dominant supply-side cost channel e¤ect in the high nancial stress regime,
reinforcing the trade o¤ between output and ination during periods of high -
nancial stress. However, the extension of the sample to 2015Q4 shows the extent
to which traditional monetary policy became ine¤ective.
Future extensions of this empirical analysis will include examining the e¤ec-
tiveness of monetary policy when unconventional measures such as quantitative
easing are used. This will involve explicitly accounting for the unconventional
measures of monetary policy instruments that monetary authorities use. Future
analyses will also extend this study to include more countries for comparison of
experiences.
References
Azariadis, C. and B. Smith (1998). Financial Intermediation and Regime
Switching in Business Cycles. The American Economic Review 88 (3), 516
536.
Balke, N. S. (2000). Credit and Economic Activity: Credit Regimes and Nonlin-
ear Propagation of Shocks. The Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2),
344349.
Barth, M. J. and V. A. Ramey (2001). The Cost Channel of Monetary Trans-
mission. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001 16, 199255.
Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler (1989). Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations. The American Economic Review 79 (1), 1431.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1996). The Financial Accelerator
and the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (1),
115.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999). The Financial Accelerator
in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework. In J. Taylor and M. Woodford
(Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1, pp. 13411393. Elsevier.
Blinder, A. S. (1987). Credit Rationing and E¤ective Supply Failures. The
Economic Journal 97 (386), 327352.
31
Borio, C. (2014). The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We
Learnt? Journal of Banking & Finance 45, 182198.
Brave, S. and R. A. Butters (2012). Diagnosing The Financial System: Fi-
nancial Conditions and Financial Stress. International Journal of Central
Banking 8 (2), 191239.
Brave, S. A. and R. A. Butters (2011). Monitoring Financial Stability: A
Financial Conditions Index Approach. Economic Perspectives 35 (1), 22.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (1997). Sticky Price and
Limited Participation Models of Money: A Comparison. European Eco-
nomic Review 41 (6), 12011249.
Claessens, S., M. A. Kose, and M. E. Terrones (2011). Financial Cycles: What?
How? When? IMF Working Paper No. 11/76.
Garcia, R. and H. Schaller (2002). Are the E¤ects of Monetary Policy Asym-
metric? Economic Inquiry 40 (1), 102119.
Gertler, M. and S. Gilchrist (1994). Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and the
Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 109 (2), 309340.
Hamilton, J. D. (1989). A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonsta-
tionary Time Series and the Business Cycle. Econometrica 57 (2), 357384.
Hansen, B. E. (1996). Inference When a Nuisance Parameter Is Not Identied
Under the Null Hypothesis. Econometrica 64 (2), 413430.
Hansen, B. E. (1997). Inference in TARModels. Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics
and Econometrics 2 (1), 124.
Hatzius, J., P. Hooper, F. Mishkin, K. L. Schoenholtz, and M. W. Watson
(2010). Financial Conditions Indexes: A Fresh Look after the Financial
Crisis. NBER Working Paper No. 16150.
Hubrich, K. and R. J. Tetlow (2012). Financial Stress and Economic Dynam-
ics: The Transmission of Crises. The Federal Reserve Board Finance and
Economics Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2012-82.
Iwata, S. and S. Wu (2006). Estimating Monetary Policy E¤ects when Interest
Rates are Close to Zero. Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (7), 13951408.
Kaufmann, S. (2002). Is there an asymmetric e¤ect of monetary policy
over time? A Bayesian analysis using Austrian data. Empirical Eco-
nomics 27 (2), 277297.
32
Koop, G., M. H. Pesaran, and S. M. Potter (1996). Impulse Response Analysis
in Nonlinear Multivariate Models. Journal of Econometrics 74, 119147.
Krugman, P. R. (1998). Its Baaack: Japans Slump and the Return of the
Liquidity Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 29 (2), 137206.
Li, F. and P. St-Amant (2010). Financial Stress, Monetary Policy, and Eco-
nomic Activity. Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2010-12.
McCallum, J. (1991). Credit Rationing and the Monetary Transmission Mech-
anism. The American Economic Review 81 (4), 946951.
Mishkin, F. S. (2009). Is Monetary Policy E¤ective during Financial Crises?
The American Economic Review 99 (2), 573577.
Oda, N. and K. Okina (2001). Further Monetary Easing Policies under the
Non-Negativity Constraints of Nominal Interest Rates: Summary of the
Discussion based on Japans Experience. Monetary and Economic Stud-
ies 19 (S-1), 323370.
Olivei, G. and S. Tenreyro (2007). The Timing of Monetary Policy Shocks.
The American Economic Review 97 (3), 636663.
Peersman, G. and F. Smets (2002). Are the E¤ects of Monetary Policy in the
Euro Area Greater in Recessions than in Booms? In L. Mahadeva and
P. Sinclair (Eds.), Monetary Transmission in Diverse Economies, pp. 28
48. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ravn, S. H. (2012). Asymmetric Monetary Policy Towards the Stock Market:
A DSGE Approach. Denmark National Bank Working Papers No. 77.
Weise, C. L. (1999). The Asymmetric E¤ects of Monetary Policy: A Nonlin-
ear Vector Autoregression Approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing 31 (1), 85108.
33
Appendix A: Data sources
Table A1: Data details and sources
Variable Data series
Real GDP Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal
Source: FRED
Mnemonic: GDPC96
Ination Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Source: FRED
Mnemonic: CPIAUCS
Commodity price index Continuous Commodity Index
Source: Bloomberg
Mnemonic: CCI:IND
Federal funds rate E¤ective Federal Funds Rate
Source: FRED
Mnemonic: FEDFUNDS
Financial conditions index Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index
Source: Chicago Federal Reserve
Mnemonic: ANFCI
Exchange rate Real Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies
Source: FRED
Mnemonic: TWEXMPA
Appendix B: Algorithm for computation of non-
linear impulse responses
The computation of nonlinear impulse response functions (IRFs) follows Koop,
Pesaran, and Potter (1996). A nonlinear impulse response function is dened as
the impact of a one-time shock on the variables, Yt, in the model, conditioned on
the history and/or the shock. The nonlinear IRF can be expressed as:
IRFy(n; ut;  t 1) = E[yt+n j  t 1; ut]  E[yt+n j  t 1]: (10)
The response of a variable y at horizon n can then be calculated as the di¤er-
ences in two conditional expectations. First, the evolution of the VAR system
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conditional on a certain history  t 1 following the shock ut is simulated. Second,
the evolution of the VAR system conditional on the same history,  t 1, without
imposing the shock ut at time t is simulated and subtracted from the former
computed conditional expectation. To obtain the impulse responses of the VAR
system conditional on the regimes (above or below the threshold value), the sim-
ulations are repeated for a su¢ cient number of histories which correspond to the
respective regime. Random shocks are allowed to hit the VAR system before and
after the shock. The nonlinear IRF approach relies on the simulation of the VAR
system under multiple sequences of the shocks. Taking an average of the con-
ditional means of the generated nonlinear IRFs evens out the shocks that were
used to generate the simulations. The result is the response of the system with
history  t 1 conditional on the shock ut only.
The following algorithm is used to compute the nonlinear IRFs.
1. Pick a history,  rt 1, corresponding to the chosen regime. This history
comprises the actual value of all the lagged endogenous variables in the
VAR at the chosen date. This implies that the realization of the threshold
variable, trt 1, is also randomly drawn from the selected regime.
2. The shocks are drawn from the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals
and assume to be jointly distributed. A k-dimensional vector ubt+n; n =
0; :::; p is drawn at each horizon, where k denotes the number of endogenous
variables in the VAR. Hence, if a shock is drawn at horizon p, all k residuals
for date p are collected.
3. The evolution of all variables in the VAR system over n + 1 periods is
simulated using the coe¢ cients that are estimated for both the low and
high nancial stress regimes and the shock process for n+ 1 periods. This
implies that the model is allowed to switch regimes over the forecast horizon.
The resulting baseline path is denoted as Yt+n(trt 1; u
b
t+n).
4. Step 4 is essentially the same as step 3, with the shock sequence at t = 0
replaced by a shock of size j for the variable j and the contemporaneous
shocks of other variables in the system. This k 1 vector is denoted as uj .
The resulting path is denoted as Yt+n(trt 1; u
b
t+n; u

j).
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated R times to allow the shocks to average out. In
this paper, R is set to 500 times.
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6. Steps 1 to 5 are repeated B times to compute an average over the history
of each regime, and to even out the R times of shock sequences. In this
paper, B is set to 500 times.
7. The nonlinear IRF is then the di¤erence between the two simulated forecasts
assuming the shock uj and assuming zero respectively.
IRF (n;  t 1; uj) = [Yt+n(t
r
t 1; u
b
t+n; u

j)  Yt+n(trt 1; ubt+n)]=(B R): (11)
Appendix C: Condence bands for nonlinear im-
pulse responses
The simulation of nonlinear IRFs is computationally intensive, taking several
hours if R and B are set to 1000 simulations runs, even when using parallel
computing to reduce computation time. If the number of bootstrap replications
for the condence bands are set to 1000 simulation runs, the entire process would
be equivalent to a simulation of 109 repetitions. In this paper, R and B are
reduced to 500 simulation runs, and the number of bootstrap repetitions is set
to 500, for e¢ ciency purposes. This allows the simulation of the bootstrapped
condence bands to be completed in approximately one week. The following
algorithm is used to compute the bootstrapped condence intervals.
1. Compute centered residuals, u^   u, and generate bootstrap residuals, u,
by drawing randomly with replacement from centered residuals.
2. Using the estimated parameters and errors from the TVAR structure, data
is generated recursively.
3. Using the recursive dataset, the regression coe¢ cients B1; 1(L); B2; 2(L)
and error terms are calculated from the TVAR with the assumption that
threshold is equivalent to the estimated value .
4. Using the original dataset, but with the coe¢ cients and errors from step
2, nonlinear IRFs are calculated using the algorithm listed in the previous
Section for all combination of shocks and initial conditions.
5. Steps 1 to 3 are repeated Z times, set to 500 bootstrap repetitions in this
paper, to generate a sampling distribution of the IRFs. The condence
bands are then drawn from the ordered bootstrap estimates at the respec-
tive signicance levels.
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Appendix D: Condence bands for the impulse
responses estimated from sample 1973Q1 2008Q4
This Appendix provides the condence bands for the regime-dependent and non-
linear impulse responses.
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Appendix E: Impulse responses for 1973Q1 2012Q4
sample
This Appendix provides the impulse responses estimated with an extended sample
from 1973Q1 to 2012Q4.
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Figure 27: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress and high nancial stress regimes - regime dependent
impulses. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note: Solid lines refer
to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress regimes.
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Figure 28: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 29: Impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 30: Impact of a 1 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate
at di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note:
Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial
stress regimes.
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Figure 31: Impact of a 2 standard deviation increaes in the federal funds rate
at di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4. Note:
Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial
stress regimes.
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Figure 32: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 33: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the high nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 34: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 35: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds
rate in the high nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-
2012Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation
decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
51
7 Appendix F: Impulse responses for 1973Q1 -
2015Q4 sample
This Appendix provides the impulse responses estimated with an extended sample
from 1973Q1 to 2015Q4.
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Figure 36: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress and high nancial stress regimes - regime dependent
impulses. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note: Solid lines refer
to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress regimes.
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Figure 37: Impact of a 1 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 38: Impact of a 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate at
di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note: Solid
lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial stress
regimes.
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Figure 39: Impact of a 1 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate
at di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note:
Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial
stress regimes.
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Figure 40: Impact of a 2 standard deviation increaes in the federal funds rate
at di¤erent initial states. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2015Q4. Note:
Solid lines refer to low nancial stress regimes. Dotted lines refer to high nancial
stress regimes.
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Figure 41: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 42: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation decline in the federal funds rate
in the high nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
55
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
Output
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Prices
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Federal funds rate
10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Financial conditions index
10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Exchange rate
Figure 43: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate
in the low nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-2012Q4.
Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation decline
in the federal funds rate respectively.
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Figure 44: Impact of a 1 and 2 standard deviation increase in the federal funds
rate in the high nancial stress regime. The model is estimated from 1973Q1-
2012Q4. Note: Solid lines and dotted lines refer to the 1 and 2 standard deviation
decline in the federal funds rate respectively.
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